Injured on the Job by a Government Employer's Intentional Conduct? Vacha v. North Ridgeville Keeps the Courthouse Door Open
The Ohio Supreme Court's Vacha v. North Ridgeville decision confirms public employees can sue a city for an employer intentional tort despite immunity. What it means.
Public employees in Ohio work for cities, counties, school districts, and townships, and nearly all of them know two things about getting hurt at work. First, workers' compensation is usually their only remedy against the employer. Second, the government they work for enjoys broad immunity from lawsuits. Put those together and many people assume a public employee can never sue the city, no matter what the city did. A decision from the Ohio Supreme Court on July 17, 2013, Vacha v. N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, says otherwise, at least when the employer's own intentional conduct caused the harm.
What happened in North Ridgeville
Lisa Vacha worked at the city's wastewater treatment plant. In 2004 the mayor asked a man named Charles Ralston, the father of two of the mayor's grandchildren, to apply for a helper position at the plant and asked the superintendent to interview him. The mayor knew his own daughter had twice called police on Ralston for domestic violence. The city did not run a criminal background check for the job, and the interviewer never asked about a criminal record. Ralston, who had misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence, assault, and disorderly conduct, was hired.
For months Ms. Vacha and Ralston worked the night shift together, generally alone and unsupervised. On June 2, 2006, Ralston raped and assaulted her at the plant. He was convicted and sent to prison.
Ms. Vacha sued the city. Among her claims was an "employer intentional tort," alleging that the city acted intentionally and with willful, wanton disregard for safety in selecting, supervising, and controlling Ralston. The city asked the court to throw the claim out under Ohio's Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744, which generally shields local governments from damage suits.
The immunity exception for employees
Chapter 2744 is not absolute. R.C. 2744.09(B) says the chapter does not apply to civil actions by an employee against the political subdivision "relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship." The purpose, as the Court explained, is to protect public employees by letting them recover against employers who would otherwise be immune.
The city argued that an intentional tort can never "arise out of" the employment relationship, borrowing a concept from workers' compensation law. The Supreme Court had already rejected that argument in 2012 in Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 131 Ohio St.3d 418, 2012-Ohio-570, holding that an employee's intentional-tort suit against a political subdivision may qualify as a matter arising out of the employment relationship when there is a causal connection between the claim and the employment.
In Vacha, the Court reaffirmed Sampson and answered the certified question the same way: R.C. 2744.09(B) may apply to an employer-intentional-tort claim by a public employee. Because the city had not shown as a matter of law that Ms. Vacha's claim lacked a causal connection to her employment, it was not entitled to summary judgment on immunity. The Court pointed out that her claim was not simply about Ralston's crime; it was about the city's own alleged intentional misconduct in hiring and supervising him, conduct that occurred inside the employment relationship.
What the Court did not decide
This is an honest post, so here is the fine print. The Court did not hold that Ms. Vacha wins. It sent the case back for the lower courts to decide whether the facts show the required connection between the city's conduct and her employment. And it did not reach the merits of the intentional-tort claim at all.
The merits are governed by R.C. 2745.01, which is one of the toughest standards in Ohio injury law. An employee must prove the employer acted "with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur," and the statute defines "substantially certain" to mean the employer acted with deliberate intent to cause the injury. The Supreme Court upheld that statute in 2010, which we covered in an earlier post on the employer intentional-tort law, and applied it strictly in late 2012 in Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685.
Two justices in Vacha concurred in part and dissented in part on exactly this point. They would have dismissed the claim outright because, in their view, evidence that the city hired a man with a violent history does not show the city deliberately intended to injure Ms. Vacha. The majority declined to decide that question. So the courthouse door is open, but the proof required once inside remains demanding.
Why this matters for public employees and their families
For injured people, Vacha does three useful things:
- It removes a blanket defense. Cities can no longer argue that intentional-tort claims by their own employees are categorically barred by immunity. That argument is finished.
- It focuses the inquiry on the employer's conduct. The Court looked at what the city itself allegedly did in hiring and supervising, not merely at the co-worker's crime. Negligent-hiring facts, such as ignored warning signs, skipped background checks, and favoritism, are the heart of these claims.
- It confirms that immunity and the intentional-tort standard are separate hurdles. Clearing one does not clear the other, which is why these cases need a lawyer who can build evidence of what the employer knew and when.
The decision fits a pattern we have written about this year. In Riffle, the Court held that a city could be liable for wanton misconduct by its EMS personnel; see our post on when 911 responders fail wantonly. In Vacha, it held that a city's own intentional misconduct toward its employee is not shielded. Immunity in Ohio remains a high wall, but it has doors, and the Court keeps confirming where they are. Our page on claims against the government explains the exceptions in more detail.
What this means for you
If you work for a city, county, township, school district, or other public body in the Dayton area and were seriously hurt at work because of something your employer knew about and deliberately ignored, you may have a claim beyond workers' compensation. These cases turn on documents: personnel files, prior complaints, background-check policies, and emails showing who knew what. That evidence can disappear or be "lost" quickly, and government claims have their own procedural rules. The time to have the situation evaluated is now, not after the workers' compensation claim closes.
We also see these facts in private employment. The intentional-tort standard under R.C. 2745.01 is the same, and our personal injury practice handles both.
This article is general information about Ohio law, not legal advice about your situation. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Deadlines and rules change; talk to a lawyer about your specific case.
You Don't Have to Carry This Alone. Talk to a Dayton Injury Lawyer.
If you were hurt on the job by your employer's deliberate disregard of a known danger, whether that employer is a city or a private company, call us. The consultation is free, we will review the facts with you, and we will tell you honestly whether the demanding intentional-tort standard can be met.