Injury Claims Against the Government in Ohio

A city snowplow crosses the center line. An RTA bus pulls away while a passenger is still on the step. A police cruiser runs a red light on a call and hits a family's minivan. In each case the responsible party is a government, and in Ohio that changes everything about how the claim works.

Most people assume you cannot sue the government. That is not quite true, but Ohio gives cities, counties, townships, school districts, and transit authorities broad immunity, with a short list of exceptions, a short deadline, and a cap on damages. I spent 19 years inside a city government as a Dayton police officer and 30 years since then bringing claims against governments for injured people. This page explains how those claims work and where the openings are.

The three-tier immunity analysis

Claims against local governments are governed by R.C. Chapter 2744, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. A "political subdivision" includes a municipal corporation, township, county, school district, and other local bodies such as regional transit authorities. R.C. 2744.01(F).

The Supreme Court of Ohio describes the analysis as three steps, most clearly in Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 119 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792, a case from Montgomery County:

1. General immunity. Under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), a political subdivision "is not liable in damages" for injury or death caused by its acts or omissions, or those of its employees, in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.
2. Exceptions. R.C. 2744.02(B) lists five situations in which immunity is lifted. If your case does not fit one, the claim fails no matter how careless the government was.
3. Defenses. Even then, the government can regain immunity by proving a defense under R.C. 2744.03.

Everything in a government case turns on step two.

The five exceptions

1. Negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), subdivisions are liable for injury "caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees" acting within the scope of their jobs. A city truck, a snowplow, a school bus, and a transit bus all qualify. The emergency-run defenses discussed below are the major limitation.

2. Proprietary functions. R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) makes subdivisions liable for negligent performance of "proprietary functions," which R.C. 2744.01(G) defines to include operating a hospital, a utility, "a busline or other transit company," and "the maintenance, destruction, operation, and upkeep of a sewer system." A transit authority running buses and a city maintaining its sewers can be liable for ordinary negligence. Designing or building a sewer, by contrast, is a governmental function, R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(l), so a backup caused by an undersized design usually cannot support a claim while one caused by negligent maintenance can.

3. Public roads. R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) covers "negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads." This exception is narrower than it sounds, as explained below.

4. Physical defects in government buildings. R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) lifts immunity for injuries caused by employee negligence "due to physical defects within or on the grounds of" buildings used for governmental functions, such as office buildings and courthouses, but not jails.

5. Liability expressly imposed by another statute. R.C. 2744.02(B)(5).

The public-roads exception and its 2003 narrowing

Before 2003, the roads exception required governments to keep roads, sidewalks, and public grounds "open, in repair, and free from nuisance," and courts read "nuisance" broadly. Senate Bill 106, effective April 2003, narrowed the exception to negligent failure to keep public roads "in repair" and to "remove obstructions."

In Howard, a teenager died after his car hit ice on Bear Creek Road in Miami Township formed from water the fire department used in a training exercise. The Supreme Court held that the ice was not an "obstruction," because an obstruction "must be an obstacle that blocks or clogs the roadway," not merely a condition that makes the road dangerous, and acknowledged that the amendment was "a deliberate effort to limit political subdivisions' liability for injuries and deaths on their roadways."

The definitions narrow it further. "Public roads" does "not include berms, shoulders, rights-of-way, or traffic control devices" unless the device is mandated by the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. R.C. 2744.01(H). Maintaining roads and sidewalks is a governmental function, R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e), so a sidewalk claim must fit an exception.

What remains: a pothole, collapsed pavement, a tree lying across the lane, or a mandated stop sign that was knocked down and never replaced can still support a claim. A dangerous curve, a poorly designed intersection, or a missing guardrail generally cannot. Sorting one from the other requires the road records. Our post on Ohio government immunity in injury cases discusses recent decisions applying these rules, and for falls on private property see our premises liability page.

Police, fire, and EMS: the emergency-run defense

Crashes involving emergency vehicles are the hardest government cases. R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) through (c) give the subdivision a "full defense" when a police officer was "responding to an emergency call," a firefighter was answering an alarm, or an EMS crew was on an emergency medical run, and the driving "did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct." An "emergency call" is defined broadly as "a call to duty." R.C. 2744.01(A).

The Supreme Court defined the key terms in Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, where a fire engine traveling 44 to 50 miles per hour in a 25 zone broadsided a minivan and killed a grandfather and his grandson. The court held that "willful," "wanton," and "reckless" are distinct standards that "are not interchangeable." Wanton misconduct is "the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result." Reckless conduct is a "conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk," substantially greater than negligence.

The court then drew a line that matters enormously to injured families: "if the conduct is only reckless, the political subdivision has a full defense to liability." The individual officer or firefighter, however, loses personal immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) for conduct that is "wanton or reckless." A recklessly driven cruiser can therefore produce a claim against the officer but not the city, with the city generally required to defend and indemnify the officer.

The court also held that violating a speed limit or departmental policy "is not per se willful, wanton, or reckless conduct, but may be relevant." These cases are won with dash-camera and body-camera video, dispatch recordings, the vehicle's event data recorder, and the department's own policies. We discuss a recent application in our post on police car crashes and the reckless standard.

The defenses in R.C. 2744.03

Even inside an exception, the government can raise the defenses in R.C. 2744.03(A). The most common are the discretion defenses for "policy-making, planning, or enforcement" decisions, R.C. 2744.03(A)(3), and for judgment about how to use equipment, personnel, and other resources, unless exercised with malice, bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Governments try to describe every failure as a discretionary decision. Courts distinguish adopting a policy, which is protected, from negligently performing a routine task, which is not. Deciding how many plows to buy is discretion. A plow driver crossing the center line is not.

Deadlines, damages, and procedure

Two years. R.C. 2744.04(A) requires an action against a political subdivision to be brought "within two years after the cause of action accrues," tolled for minors and people under a legal disability under R.C. 2305.16. The complaint may not state a dollar amount. R.C. 2744.04(B). Our guide chapter on deadlines and the timeline of an Ohio injury case covers the calendar.

No punitive damages. R.C. 2744.05(A).

Collateral-source deduction. Under R.C. 2744.05(B), insurance and other collateral benefits are deducted from any award, and your insurer cannot pursue the government for reimbursement; in exchange, you need not repay the deducted amounts.

The $250,000 cap. R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) places no limit on damages that represent "actual loss," meaning medical expenses, lost wages, and future care. But damages that do not represent actual loss, the statute's way of describing pain and suffering and other noneconomic harm, "shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars in favor of any one person," except in wrongful death actions. For a catastrophic but non-fatal injury this is a serious limit, and one reason we always look for other responsible parties, such as a contractor or a private driver, whose liability is not capped. Our guide chapter on what your case is worth explains how caps work.

Claims against the State of Ohio

Claims against the state itself, including ODOT, state universities, and state agencies, follow a different path. The state has waived its immunity and "consents to be sued" in the Ohio Court of Claims in Columbus "in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties," subject to R.C. Chapter 2743. R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). Recoveries are reduced by insurance and other collateral recoveries. R.C. 2743.02(D).

Two features matter most. There is no jury: R.C. 2743.11 says no claimant "shall be entitled to have his civil action against the state determined by a trial by jury." And the deadline is two years under R.C. 2743.16(A). A crash with an ODOT truck belongs in the Court of Claims; a crash with a city truck belongs in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court under Chapter 2744. Filing in the wrong court wastes time you do not have.

Federal claims: Wright-Patterson and the VA

Injuries caused by federal employees at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base or the Dayton VA Medical Center, including crashes with government vehicles and negligent care at the VA, fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act rather than Ohio's immunity statutes. Before suing, you must present a written administrative claim to the responsible agency, which has six months to act before its silence is treated as a denial. 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). The claim must be presented within two years of accrual, and suit must be filed within six months after the agency mails a denial. 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The amount you can later sue for is generally limited to the amount in the administrative claim. 28 U.S.C. 2675(b).

Frequently asked questions

Can I sue the City of Dayton if a city truck or RTA bus hit me? Yes. Negligent operation of a motor vehicle is an exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), and running a busline is a proprietary function. The claim must be filed within two years, and noneconomic damages are capped at $250,000 per person.

A police car hit me while responding to a call. Do I have a case? Possibly. The city has a full defense unless the officer's driving was willful or wanton, but the officer personally can be liable for wanton or reckless driving under Anderson v. Massillon.

I fell on a broken city sidewalk. Can I recover? Sometimes. After the 2003 amendment and Howard v. Miami Twp., the claim must involve a failure to keep the roadway in repair or remove an obstruction.

Where do I sue the State of Ohio or ODOT? In the Ohio Court of Claims under R.C. 2743.02, within two years, with a judge rather than a jury deciding the case. Injuries at Wright-Patterson or the Dayton VA are federal claims under the FTCA, which require an administrative claim within two years.